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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to explore opportunities designed
to expand the role of internal affairs in preventing police
misconduct in general, and excessive force in particular.
Recent events have focusednationalattentionupon the issue
of misconduct, especially excessive force, by police. Too
often, brutality is seen as an unfortunate but nonetheless
necessary adjunct of crime fighting. 1
American civil Liberties Union:
According to the
Certainly, police mistreatment of civilians happens
too often and in many cities is commonplace.
Police brutality can never be condoned, but it can
be explained. In one sense it reflects the
heightened sense of violence, real or imagined,
that now permeates our inner cities. No group is
more aware of that fact than the police themselves.
From the chiefs of police to the cop on the beat,
the streets they patrol are perceived by them as a
combat zone, fraught with thugs and pushers
carrying the most lethal of weapons. The political
rhetoric about a "war" on drugs and a "war" on
crime has helped turn the police into soldiers, not
civil servants or quardians of community order,
making them sometimes more aggressive and forceful
than they have a right to be in the pursuit of
criminals and suspects.
When "war" is declared on drugs, the implicit
message is "win at all costs." Basic standards of
reasonable force and probable cause become mere
luxuries. "Wars" are the most extreme exercises in
"Us vs Them" and necessarily involve the labelling
of entire-groups of people as "enemies" whether or
not they have individually engaged in any wrongful
acts. The result can be tactics and actions that
are disturbingly racist. "Wars" inevitably involve
"collateral damage" on innocent civilians and must
be tolerated for the greater cause. Applying these
concepts to domestic policing is not only
frightening and dangerous, it is ultimately
counter-productive. 2
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Instead of viewing these recent events as another barrier
between the police and the community, it is important these
incidents be seized as an opportunity to bring the police and
the community together in a common effort.
...
That effort should
be to re-examine the mission, values and principles of
policing in a free society to ensure those values and
principles represent the appropriate foundation upon which the
delivery of police services are based. The police have long
understood the value of precisely articulated goal and
objective statements. Over the last few years, this
understanding has expanded to include acknowledgement of the
importance of more accurately describing the mission, values
and culture of policing. As stated by Spokane washington
Chief of Police Terrence J. Mangan:
Our values announce who we are and what we stand
for. Organizational values need to be identified,
articulated and related to the every day functions
of our agencies. They are the underpinning of our
ethical code. All of our rules, regulations,
policies, and procedures must reflect these
organizational values
Well before the release of the now-famous videotape
of the Rodney King beating in Los Angles (and the
nationwide ripple effect), the law enforcement
profession had begun developing a more positive,
dreative approach to the issues of organizational,
professional and personal ethics. The FBI has
included ethics as a part of its Law Enforcement
Executive Development Institute . for more than a
decade.. Courses in organizational and executive
ethics have been offered through the Command
College system since its inception. In some
states, basic academy curricula have been realigned
to ensure that a sense of ethics and integrity is
presented throughout the technical training and
educational subject areas.
The significance of these efforts should not be
missed: for law enforcement, more than any other
branch of public service, integrity, ethics and
- --- - n_-
- - -- -- n_- - -
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credibility are the "coin of the realm." Law
enforcement agencies can have the latest in
technology--from high-speed satellite
communications to mobile computer systems to the
best in DNA genetic fingerprint investigative
resouraes--but if our citizens/clients do not trust
us and believe in us, they will not talk to us, and







Throughout this evolution in the philosophy of pOlicing, one
element has been very conspicuous by its absence - a true
partnership with the police evidenced by meaningful community
input in the effort to enhance the quality of neighborhood
life. Of critical importance in the next step in this
evolution relative to the re-examination of the mission,
values and principles of policing is inclusion, in a real



















the community and inclusion in value and policy considerations
is pointedly described by the American civil Liberties Union:
Police policies should be subject to public review
and debate instead of being viewed as the sole
province of police insiders. Open pOlicy-making
not only allows police officials to take advantage
of community input, it also provides an opportunity
for police officials to publicly explain why
certain tactics or procedures may be necessary .
Local police departments should have little
;nterest in policies or practices that cannot
withstand public scrutiny.4
An excellent example of a true partnership between the police
and the community in the effort to enhance police operations
recently occurred in Portland, Oregon.
The community policing philosophy and pOlice use-
of-force issues are dovetailing in Portland,
Oregon, where police officials have announced a
one-day, public symposium at which force policies

















In keeping with the Police Bureau's commitment to
cQmmunity policing, neighborhood residents are
directly involved in the planning of the meeting,
working side-by-side with police organizers.
Marsha Palmer, a crime-prevention coordinator for
the coalition of Northeast Neighborhoods and one of
the sYmposium's organizers, said the session will
aim not only to educate citizens about police
deadly force policies, but also to give them the
opportunity to comment on those policies.
In small-group discussions, participants will be
urged to make suggestions about police use-of-force
policies. The response will be included in a
report to the Police Bureau, which may draw upon
them in the event that policy chal1gesare made.
Said Palmer, "The intention is to provide the
bureau with suggestions that may be included in
some policy or procedural changes.1I5
Once the hurdle of community inclusion has been surpassed by
a re-examinationof the policing mission, as we!.las the
values and principlesof policingin a free society,the next
step in the process should be to vi~w the prevention of police
misconduct from the prospective of those (re-examined) values










explore the role of internal affairs in this prevention
process.
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REACTIVE KODBL OF INTBRNAL AFFAIRS
As the investigative arm of the Chief of Police, internal
affairs units provide substance to a police agency's
commitment to provide competent, fair and impartial police
services. As stated in standard 19.3 by the National Advisory
Commission on criminal Justice standards and Goals, Police:
The chief executive of every police agency
immediately should ensure that the investigation of
all complaints from the public, and all allegations
of criminal conduct and serious internal
misconduct, are conducted by a specialized
individual or unit of the involved police agency.
This person or unit should be responsible directly
to the agency's chief executive or the assistant
chief executive. Minor internal misconduct may be
investigated by the first line supervisors, and
these investigations should be subject to internal
review. 6
Reactive investigations conducted by internal affairs units
are similar to investigations conducted by traditional
mainstream reactive investigators in that the conduct that
caused the complaint has already occurred(as opposed to being
ongoing) and has been reported to authorities. In this
context, there is little operational difference whether the
conduct alleged was a robbery committed by a citizen or a
theft committed by a police officer. In either instance, the
police organization is merely responding to the allegation of
a victim or witness by assigning an investigator to gather all
relevant evidence and facts pertaining to an incident that has
already occurred. The reactive acti vi ties of an internal
affairs unit have a preventative effect upon the incidence of
6
misconduct by police not by having direct responsibility for
disciplinary decisions, but instead by making visible the
facts surrounding such incidents to those who do have such
responsibility. To the extent that reactive internal affairs
investigations are conducted in a consistently aggressive, no-
nonsense style, field officers receive the message that
misconduct in general, and excessive force in particular, is
not condoned nor tolerated by the chief executive officer or
the agency. Specifically, the message received is that
misconduct is considered inconsistent with the culture of the
organization. The scrutiny caused by these investigations
serves to keep field officers diligent by reminding them of
their responsibilities and the values, principles and
standards they are duty-bound and sworn to uphold. Therefore,
it can reasonably be argued that every time an investigation
is conducted into allegations of misconduct, other potential
misconduct is prevented. The preventative effect of this
aggressive style of reactive~ complaint investigations is
pointedly described by Paul Myron in an article concerning
corruption problems within the Philadelphia Police Department
and i..t'sown subsequent "white paper" on integrity.
As has been observed in past indiscretions within
our department, integrity problems start small and
grow to whatever heights the system permits.
We must never forget that once an officer steps
over the line, at least two things happen to him
psychologically: he finds it easier to step over
the next time, and the distance he may go is of
little concern.7
There has been little historical consistency among police
7
organizations relative to the manner in which complaints
alleging police misconduct are received and processed. The
implications today of an absence of procedural consistency and
focus upon prevention appears in a recent article in Law
Enforcement News.
The attorney representing an alleged victim of
police brutality in an upcoming civil trial is
seeking to call as a witness James D. st.Clair, the
principal author of a recent, highly critical
report on the Boston Police Department, in an
effort to back up assertations that the
department's internal affairs unit routinely
ignored citizens'scomplaintsagainst police.
The .report,released in January, caused a citywide
furor and forceda major shakeupin the upper ranks
of the Boston Police Department. It presented a
scathing review of what it called a "shoddy and
half-hearted" internal affairs process that was
"unfairly skewed against those who make a
complaint"and characterizedby "lengthydelays and
inadequatedocumentationand record keeping." The
report also led to the creation of a community
appeals board to oversee the Internal Affairs
Division and numerous other reforms.8
The article goes on to explain the manner in which legal
exposure is created due to a disfunctionalinvestigationand
discipline process.
-Under Federal Law, proof that a police agency has a
"defacto" policy of overlooking misconduct makes
the city, as well as individual officers, liable
for monetary damages. "It's very difficult to
-establish liability u. u against a municipa:lity,"
Costello explained. "You can't use a single act to
do it. You can't say that the police officer was
working for the city and therefore, they were
liable. You can't even say that because a
particular act involved was so outrageous, the city
should have known about it. You have to allege
that there was some type of custom or policy, that
this has been going on, and the city knew about it
and didn't do anything.,,9
8
Difficulties such as those confronting the Boston Police
Department are unfortunate and in large part unnecessary. It
is past time for everyone in the police profession to
understand that the unique powers of the police are given to
them by the people, and are therefore a priviledge rather than
a right. As such, it is likewise past time for the police to
acknowledge the right of the people to insist the exercise of
power by police be justified. In an effort to assist police
agencies in the development of functional and valid comlaint
investigation and disciplinary processes, a model policy was
adopted by the Police Executive Research Forum in september of
1981. In the area of complaint receipt and processing, this
model policy advises:
Complaints shall be accepted from any source,
whether made in person, by mail or over the
telephone. Individualsare encouraged to submit
their complaints in person in order to obtain as
complete a report as soon as possible after the
incident. In cases in which the complainantcannot
file the report in person, agency personnel may
visit the individualat his or her home, place of
business or hospital in order to complete the
report.
Complaints shall be accepted from anonymous
sources, juveniles and persons under arrest in
~olice custody so long as the complaint contains
sufficient factual information to warrant an
investigation. Each complaint shall be
investigated to its logical conclusion and the
investigation results properly placed into the
appropriate category of completed cases.10
The model policy goes on to describe the minimum elements of
a basic investigation into allegations of police misconduct.
complaints of repeated harassment, demeanor and
serious rule infractions, and complaints of a
serious nature shall be handled by the internal
9
affairs 'office. " ,An o~fice investiqator shall
conduct a conf14en~~al, lnv~~t'lgation of the
qomplaint. andas.~le the ,nece$sary materials,
such as: '
1. PhYli?ical evidence
2. statements or interViews from
3. statements or lntervi'ews fr,6n1
specialized interest such as:
employers, lawyers, teachers,
parentsI' etc.
4. Investigative aids, such as the various reports,





Uponcompletion of tne investigation, decisipns must be made
rel~tive to the culpability, if any, on the part of the
officer. At this stage of the process, the value of a
thorough and comprehensive investigation cannot be
overemp~asized. After a complete analysis of the evidence
provided by the investigation, the model policy suggests that
conclusions of fact be developed from one of five different
dispositions.
Proper conduct: The allegation is true, but the
action of the agency or the officer was consistent
with departmental policy, and the complainant
suffered no harm.
-'"
Imprope;J:" COI1c:1uct: The allegation. is true and the
acti°1'\ c,;..9fiE~...the' ~gel1cy or, the '," officer was
anconsistent with' department policy, and the
comp~.inant suffered harm.
Po].icy fai~ure: The allegation is true, and
,although-tHe action of the agency or the Officer
'was not inconsistent with department policy" the
complainant. suffered harm.
Insufficient evidence: Tbfare is insufficient
eviderice to prove or refute the allegation.
Unfounded complaint: Either the allegation is
demonstrably false or there is no credible evidence
to support it. 12
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Adoption of the model policy on police handling of citizen
complaints offered by the Police Executive Research Forum
provides agencies with a fair, consistent and defendable
internal affairs process that will be supportable by officers
as well as the community. In addition to its other
attributes, the notion of prevention of police misconduct is
clearly not overlooked.
It is the policy of this agency to emphasize the
prevention of misconduct as the primary means of
reducing and controlling it. While disciplinary
actions are properly imposed on officers who have
engaged in wrongdoing, they are of limited utility
if they shield organizational conditions which
permit the abuses to occur. Too often inadequate
training and lack of supervision are factors that
contribute to the officers' improper behavior.
This agency shall make every effort to eliminate
the organizational conditions which may foster,
permit, or encourage improper behavior by its
employees. 13
Conflict between the police and members of the community are
inevitabie. It is therefore important that a mechanism exist
that is acceptable to all and that considers each complaint as
a potentially serious matter that merits thorough and
comprehensive investigation. Community cooperation and
officer compliance is in great part contingent upon the
perception of an open, honest and competent investigation
process. The critical importance of the existence of a viable
complaint investigation process is offered by Gerald W. Lynch,
President of John Jay College of Criminal Justice.
No subject is more crucial to the professionalism
and credibility of police work than the issue of
police integrity. Unless the police effectively
police themselves, no citizenry will respect what
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double role in society: first to police the
citizenry and second to police themselves. This
second obligation is crucial to the first. If
police departments do not seek always to maintain
police integrity and to identify, expose, and deal
appropriately with brutality, corruption, and ,the
misuse of police power, they will have failed as
pOlice agencies. In this sense, the police have a
double burden: they must do their jobs and they
must constantly analyze and scrutinize how their
members are doing that job. They do not have the
luxury of arguing that they are too busy doing
their work to worry about how it is getting done.
They cannot hold that the ends justify the means,
that "all's well that ends well". This process by
which they police a society, then, is as important
as the actual policing. To argue otherwise is to
unleash the great powers of the police to the
capricious, arbitrary, brutal, or corrupt whims of
individual police officers, or of whole
dep~rtments, or of the sovereign state itself.'4
To the extent that this perception of the complaint
investigation process is based in reality, two issues relative
to misconduct by pOlice clearly become arguable. First, there
can exist a reasonable expectation that repeated misconduct on
the part of the same officers will be reduced. Second, the
potential for misconduct by other officers may be prevented.









exist relative to the affirmative link between reactive
complaint investigations and the prevention of police
misconduct.
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PROACTIVB ROLB OF INTBRNAL AFFAIRS
Comprehensive proactive compliance programs are not widespread
in the profession, and are invariably controversial in the
agencies where they do exist. The absence of management use
of these techniques is directly related to the power and
influence of some police labor groups as well as certain
elements of the communities.
Many of the police administrators interviewed by
the Project staff said that they would like to do
more than they did about problems of misconduct and
corruption, but they felt that any action they took
might be interpreted as indicating a major
corruption problem instead of a minor one. Chiefs
also stated other reasons for not initiating an
aggressive anti-corruption policy. Some were
concerned about the police union and police morale;
others were worried about the reaction of public
groups who support the police or who have an
interest in perpetuating petty forms of
corruption. 15
This reluctance on the part of many police chief executives is
understandable but nonetheless sad and unfortunate. Indeed,
a strong argument can be made that officers properly carrying
out their duties have few, if any, valid reasons not to
welcome proactive compliance techniques.
While initially one may view the beginning phase of
a corruption control program as a rather primitive
attempt at producing behavioral change, the long-
range effects of such a beginning should not be
underestimated. If one assumes that most police
officers are basically honest, hardworking people
who wish to do a good job, a pervasive
organizational effort to root out serious
corruption provides these officers with an
opportunity to resist peer group pressure in that
direction. A strong proactive internal affairs
13
initiative provides "an excuse for being honest"
that may be acceptable to many of the rank and
file. After all, every police officer recognizes
the consequencesof being caught in a corrupt act.
Under intensesupervision,reluctanceto engage in
unethical behavior may be viewed not only ~s
acceptable but also perhaps as prudent. As a
result, many officers who are seeking ethical
guidance may secretly welcome such efforts if
policies are realistic and fair.16
compounding the frustration experienced by police executives,
line officers and large segments of the community concerning
the dep10Yment of proactive compliance is the virtual absence
of credible debate as to its necessity. Particularly with the
prolifer~tion of illegal narcotics and associated crimes
across the country, allegationsof officers tempted beyond
their ethical limits have surfaced with increasing frequency.
The emergence of corruption as a criminal justice
problem of major proportions is highlighted by
exposes and investigations which have appeared in
the national press. Many recent books and articles
in professional police journals have focused on
such problems as they relate to the law enforcement
field; however, it is clear that corruption affects
almost all agencies of national, state, and
municipal government and the private sector as
well. .
The problem for the police is particularly critical
at this time, and if anything, it has become more
.serious since the middle of the 1970s, with the
introduction of narcotics as an important variable
in the corruption equation. At the time of this
publication, major police corruption investigations
have been reported in New York City, Philadelphia,
. and Boston ,and. .throughout many of the
municipalities of Dade County, Florida. The Dade
County and New York City investigations are
directly related to narcotics; in Philadelphia and
Boston! the issues are gambling and organizedcrime. 7
The consequences of failing to prevent corrupt behavior on the
part of police before it occurs or failing to forcefully
14
respond to the behavior in its initial stages have substantial
consequences.
Th~se recent revelations once again underscore the
seriousness of the problem of corruption in
policing. Apart from the obvious economic costs,
there are other latent and perhaps more serious
consequences. In corrupt departments there is
waste and inefficiency. vital services which
should be available to the public are either not
provided or provided on a conditional basis.
Officers preoccupied with selling crack or making a
"score" have little interest in public service.
Probably the most important consequences of a major
police corruption scandal are the almost immediate
reduction in confidence in city government and a
heightened sense of insecurity among the general
public. Lack of trust in the police is often
generalized to include all governmental operations
as the most visible representatives of local
government. Law and justice and the lofty
sentiments these terms conjure up become the
subject of derision upon the realization that many
of the community's ~rotectors may also be listed
among its criminals. 8
Proactive investigation techniques utilized by internal
affairs units do not differ ~ubstantially from the methods
employed by mainstream law enforcement units to detect and
apprehend criminal suspects. Most internal affairs units
have, however, developed manuals of procedures and guidelines
for their investigators. These manuals are designed to
establish a concerted, systematic approach to the respective
agency's anti-corruption. program. The manuals usually list
corruption-prone or hazardous situations which merit careful
monitoring, as well as specifying places where officers could
easily become involved in corrupt activities. One of the more
sophisticated of these manuals was developed by the New York
City Police Department. Under each listing of a potential
15
problem are five major headings~
. Hazards
. Indicators of Problem
. Procedures to Control
. Enforcement Policy
. Accountability for Adherence19
An excellent example of a problem area selected from the
manual is narcotics.
HAZARDS:
":'-prior to booking, the unlawful release of
prisoners in exchange for money, narcotics, or
other qifts.
--unwarranted dismissal of. court cases after
police conspiracy with offenders.
--the withholding of contraband by police for
private use, future sale, or the practice commonly
known as "flaking" or placing evidence of a crime
on a person who does not actually possess it.
INDICATORS OF PROBLEM:




--repeated observations of police at locations
frequented by narcotics users, especially when no
other police business is occurring at those
.locations.
--despite the receipt of complaints, narcotic
locations flourishing without proper police action
being taken.
--a pattern of complaints that charge improper
search and seizure.
--a pattern of complaints by prisoners alleging
that money, other valuables, and narcotics are
missing after the suspects have been searched by
police.
--a pattern of allegations of evidence being
placed on a supposedly innocent person to justify
an arrest.
--an unusual number of court cases being
dismissed because of incomplete or faulty court
affidavits, poor testimony, or non-appearance of
specific officers which
of arrests for loitering
by people waiting to buy
specific members of the department.
--members of the department spending money
presumably in excess of their income.
--possible narcotic use by members indicated, in
addition to the usual physical siqn~, by exc~ssive
sick report time (noting type of illness), neglect
of personal appearance; constant fatique;
inadequate attention to duty; alleqationsor rumors
of an individual's involvement with usaqe;
unexplained disappearance from station house of
property from personal lockers, vouchered property,
and office equipment; and observations of a
departmentmember's associates.
PROCEDURES TO CONTROL:
closely supervise subordinates in the field to
insure the proper handling of arrests and searches.
Establish strict procedures for searches and the
recording of evidence. Immediate search in
presence of station house supervisor and recording
of evidence should be made. supervisor should
issue a receipt for evidence that the arresting
officer can place in his memo book.
Hold frequent conferences with superior officers
and community groups to obtain information related
to suspected practices in narcotics enforcement.
Initiate frequent independent or parallel
observations of narcotic locations and of suspected
officers.
Frequently review individual records to
determine suspicious trends in arrests,
dispositions, and investigative results.
Train members in current departmental procedures
and policies.
Hold periodic, unannounced locker inspections to
discover the unlawful withholding of evidence or
contraband.
Review all narcotic arrests by superior
officers, especially cases that are dismissed in
,court .
ENFORCEMENT POLICY:
strict enforcement should be made of all laws
pertaining to narcotics.
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ADHERENCE1
superior officers should be responsible for
institutingall measures listed under "Procedures
to Control. ,,20
16



















selected from the New York City Police Department Internal
Affairs Manual, proactive investigative techniques are not
substantially different from those utilized in the
investigation of suspected civilian offenders. Nevertheless,
these approaches to control police misconduct are not utilized
with the same frequency or enthusiasm as they are used to
address suspected civilian offenders. Specific proactive













. Proactive situational Testing
. Turn-abouts--use of a corrupt officer who,
when caught, is allowed to make a deal to assist in
identifying others involved in corrupt activities.
. Field Agents--recently employed officers who




. Integrity Testing or "SIRTS"(Self-Initiated
Reliability Tests)
. Found property, wallets, money, etc.
. Questionnaires
. Random spot Audits of:
. Field activity
. Case preparation
. Case dismissals vs. convictions
. Vehicle towing records
. Traffic citation records
. Incident reports
. Audio _~orradio tapes
. MDT and MDI transmissions
. Extra employment records
. Computer logs





. Reward System--payments, ranging from cash to
promotions for not only remaining personally
corruption free, but also initiating action against
those offering bribes or officers who have accepted
them.
A major factor in maintaining a corruption free culture or in
18
changing the culture of a police agency to rej-ectcorrupt
behavior lies in providing police personnel with values based
upon the highest ethical, legal and constitutional standards.
With prevention of misconduct as the central focus, the
negative values of secrecy, isolation and silence must be
replaced with those of visibility, openness and sharing of
information. Logic and experience indicates that proactive
compliance programs can playa major part in the process to
















BHBRGZNG ROLE 01' ZNTBRNAL APPAZRS
Historically, the work product of internal affairs units has
been used primarily to justify punishment. A frequent topic
of debate concerning punishment within policing today,
however, is the weight retribution should have in the internal
affairs function. In particular, traditional police managers
have been criticized for giving far too much weight to the
retribution aspects of punishment. The argument advanced is
that the.retrospective orientation of retribution that looks
to correcting past wrongs should not take precedence over a
prospective orientation that seeks to ensure that what
happened will not be repeated.











solved once blame has been assigned (which means that the
person responsible has been identified and punished), while
the organizational environment that prompted the wrongdoing in
the first place is not addressed. In simpler terms, a strong
argument can be presented that traditional disciplinary
systems that focus upon retribution have the effect of
treating the sYmptoms of pOlice misconduct rather than the
causes. If this premise is accepted, the exclusive use of
punishment to right past wrongs may actually be detrimental to
a long term remedy relative to police misconduct.
What are the implications to internal affairs of this evolving
20
view of the traditional purpose of its work product? Clearly
one of the implications is the expansion of the internal
affairs role to include that of an information source designed
to assist in the prevention of police misconduct. The need
for this capability has been acknowledged, if not achieved,
for years. For example, the Police Executive Research Forum
addressed this issue in its model policy concerning police
handling of citizen complaints adopted in 1981.
Monthly reports shall be prepared by the internal
affairs office for submission to the agency's chief
executive that summarize the nature and disposition
of -all misconduct complaints received by the
agency. Further, notation will be made of age, sex
and racial characteristics of the complainants and
the officers, as well as the complainants'
residential neighborhoods. Terminated complaints
shall be recorded and reasons for the termination
explained.
Copies of the report shall be distributed to all
command and supervisory personnel, as well as to
training commanders. Notations shall be made for
corrective actions of any developing patterns of
abuse of a similar nature in a particular
neighborhood.
An annual report, summarizing the types of
complaints received and the dispositions of the
complaints,shallbe preparedand made availableto
members of the public and the press. The names of
.complainantsand accused officers shall not be
publ ished in this report. 21
There is without question an abundance of information, in the
form of raw data or statistics, for the most part sitting idle
within the files of internal affairs units. As raw data the
usefulness of this information is limited. However,
development of that data, along with the experience of
















the effort to identify types of behavior that lead to citizen
dissatisfaction and conflict. According to Dr. Malcolm K.
Sparrow of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University:
Aggregate categorization of complaints by disposal
make up the statistics required of the IAD, either
by law or tradition. They are periodically
transmitted to the various watchdog agencies-city
councils, police complaints authorities, central
governments, the mayor's office, police
inspectorate, etc. It is partly by these
statistics that the level of public dissatisfaction
with the pOlice service will be monitored.
But the information gained by investigating
offtcers along the way may tell a very different
story from the resulting statistic. The
investigator hears, at some length, why it was that
a complainant was dissatisfied. This information
is important because it gives the investigators a
very clear idea of those aspects of police activity
or inactivity that cause public concern. The IAD
staff are thus in a unique position to build-over
time-a remarkably complete picture of the ways in








Statistical summaries are the principal form in
which information is released from the complaints
department. The actual message conveyed by these
statistics includes very little, if anything, about
what police are currently doing wrong and how they
might improve. They focus almost exclusively on
the possible formal outcomes, including the number
of cases referred to outside investigative or
. supervisory bodies, as well as the breakdown of
case disposals. Overall, such statistics tell more
about the routing of complaint files than they do
about the successes and failures of the police.
They are bland and uninformative.22
Dr. Sparrow goes on to explain why this combination of
personnel experience and information is underused.
In practice, the disposal of the complaint is
carefullyrecorded,and will be disseminatedto all
of the relevantexternalagenciesas a contributing
statistic. But the informationregarding public
22
dissatisfaction will, on the whole, go nowhere.
But if the IAD is really in such a good position to
understand the current forms of public
dissatisfaction, why are their insights not put to
better use? Without doubt, these investigators can
identify both the types of officers and the types
of behavior that provoke complaints; they become
aware of the variety of motivations behind public
complaints; and they know the identities of those
officers who repeatedly cause problems.
They learn these things, though, by accident rather
than by design. They are not required to analyze
cases in order to generate any coherent and
reliable picture of the shifting pattern of
complaints, the way in which public perceptions of
police duty change from year to year, the possible
causes of dissatisfaction or the behavior of any
"rotten apples" within their department.
If such analysis is not expected or required, it
will not get done; if it does not get done, its
results cannot be effectively routed to management
and troops. The analysis does not get communicated
because it is not requested.a
There are a number of functional units or entities, both
internal and external to pOlice agencies, that could benefit
substantially from the development and analysis of raw data
found in internal affairs units' files. Internally, these
units or entities include the police chief executive, the
training unit'and the personnel concerns unit. Exter.nally,
members of civilian review boards as well as th~ ~6mmunity
itself can benefit greatly from access to thismat~rial.
Indeed, just as the list of 'potential users of this
information is varied, the cont~xt in which the material may
be considered is likewise multi-faceted.
CHISP
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Information developed through detailed review and analysis of
raw data contained in internal affairs files can be of
critical importance to the police chief executive in assessing
a variety of areas such as policy development, deploYment
strategies, community support, etc. . Moreover, proper
preparation and analysis of such information can assist the
police chief, administrators and area commanders in assessing,
for example, the complaint ratios between one and two officer
units; risk factors in different geographic areas of the
jurisdiction; policy compliance variances between shifts,
geograph~c areas, groups of officers (new vs. veteran, male
vs. female, etc.), as well as a myriad of other factors that
would enhance their ability to lead their organization more
effectively. The informationdeveloped from the raw data
contained in internal affairs unit files can assist the police
chief executive in assessing the needs and expectations of
various segments of the community while at the same time
preventing conflict. Moreover, the importance of avoiding
unnecessary conflict and satisfying the legitimate
expectations of the community cannot be overemphasized.
There is no reason why those objectives cannot be
attained by the person who serves as police chief.
They are, in fact, part and parcel of the chief's
responsibilities as an agency head. If the chief
is not responsive and not accountable, and does not
administer the agency in a manner consonant with
the reasonable expectations of the people whose
taxes support it, it is difficult to see why he or
she continues on the police payroll. If the chief
does not run the department satisfactorily, and is
not committed to achieving those objectives, he or
she should be fired and replaced by someone whose




In this report, the issue of training is not presented in the
context of training internal affairs personnel, but instead
how internal affairs personnel and the information they
possess can be utilized to expose field personnel to hiqh risk
situations and behaviors that contribute to or cause conflict
and citizen dissatisfaction. Indeed, most police
administrators depend upon the efforts of their internal
affairs or inspectionsunits to identifyareas of corruption
or misco~duct. Unfortunately, however, it apparently ~ever
occurred to many of those same administrators in the past to
consider training a viable alternative in the effort to
control or prevent police misconduct. In fact, only recently
has a concerted effort been made to establish training courses
to examine corruption problems. 25 The cost of failing to
consider training as a means to control or prevent police
misconducthas been great.
By its decision in Monell vs Department of Social
Services in 1979,'The U.S. Supreme Court held that
municipalities could be sued for civil rights
violations if they maintained an unconstitutional
custom, policy or practice that caused the
constitutional deprivation. This was a major
departure from existing federal laws. 2 Subsequent
cases have wrestled further with what evidence is
necessary to prove the existence of a custom, policy
or practice.
In the training area--an important corollary to
policies and practices--thesame Supreme Court has
held that a failure to train constitutes a municipal
policy for purposes of Monell liability if the failure
reflects a deliberate indifference to the
constitutionairights of its inhabitants.3
Where the need for training is obvious, but the






















that rights violations are likely to result, liability
will be imposed.' Too often, we overlook the fact
.that the failure to train consistently and in
accordance wi~ our own'policies is likely to result
in constitutional deprivations and-thereforeliability
on thp.entit~ and its policy maker (that is, the chief
or sheriff). 6
It is apparent that even the courts recognize the importance
of training in the effort to develop a culture within the law
enforcement community that focuses upon service rather than
conflict. It must be aC;:knowledged,however, that not only is
training police officers necessary, the type of training is
equally important if misconduct is to be prevented. In
addition'to various forms of ethics and anti-corruption
training that has been available for some time, more realistic









Perhaps the most popular form of training is known as
"ethical awareness," a practical, realistic program
designed to address corruption as a form of
socialization in police work. Officers are confronted
with simulated situations involving a decision making
process. ~e program is viewed by many police
administratorsas more effective than a series of
lectures warning the officers of the evils and dangers
of corruption.
IQeally, . ~be curJ:'ic;:ulumwill include practical
exerci:.ses whIch require students to make decisi-ons in
a variety of situations. The exercises work well with
recruits, in-service personnel, and supervisors.27
Law enforcement officers must be well trained so they do not
perform as an occupying army who .yiew citizens as aliens or
enemies, but rather that they act as a community resource
working in conjunctionwith othersocial resourcesto enhance
the quality of community life for all.
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PERSODBL CONCERNS PROGRUI
An excellent example of a positive effort on the part ~f many
law enforcement agencies to prevent police misconduct is the
Personnel Concerns Program. This program, adopted in various
forms by a variety of police agencies across the country, is
designed to identify errant officers and intervene in their
negative behaviors before serious misconduct occurs.
Personnel Concerns Programs are positive in nature and are
almost always formally separated from an agency's disciplinary
system. . The driving philosophy of these programs is that
employees with negative behavioral patterns can be identified
and a strategy for reversing these patterns can be devised and
implemented.~ The positive impact of this type of prevention
strategy is further explained by Chief william A. Liquori:
We also need to institute a system to identify the
older employee who shows characteristics of
unacceptable behaviors in order to address them early
on. It is better--and sometimes less expensive--to
turn around an older employee than to let the
situation degenerate to the point where he is
ultimately fired and a new employee is hired.~
Qualifying criteria varies to an extent froltprogram to
program, but the criteria considered in the Houston Police
Department is typical:
Those employees who will be assigned to the Personnel
Concerns Program will be identified by either of four
. means:
a. Data scanning by the Personnel Concerns unit--under
this process, the computer will flag those employees
who experience five or more lAD and/or Administrative
complaints, which are either sustained or not-
sustained, or two or more excessive force complaints,
27
criminal activity complaints, or discharge of firearms
with injury incidents within a 12 month period.
b. Any supervisor of an employee who identifies
negative behavioral patterns and requests a review by
the PCU, via his chain of command.
c. Upon_recommendation from either the Administrative
Disciplinary Committee (ADC) or the Administrative
Personnel Committee (APC).
d. Chief of Police--At the direction of the Chief of
Police an empl~ee will be reviewed by the PersonnelConcerns unit.
The decision to have an officer participate in a Personnel
Concerns Program is usually based upon a recommendation from
a progra~ committee, with the final decision made by the Chief
of Police. Much of the informationutilized to consider
whether or not the officer should become a participant in the
program comes from the agency's internal affairs unit. Upon
an officer being entered into the program, a "plan of action"
is usually developed. Once again, the mechanism utilized by
the Houston Police Department is fairly typical:
Upon receipt of the PCC recommendation that the
subject employee be mandated to participate in the
program, the PCU will schedule a meeting with the
employee's Chain of Command to discuss the
deficiencies addressed by the pce, and develop a
strategy to address those concerns. Attendance at
this meeting will be mandatory of the following
individuals:
a. The employee
b. The employeeJs immediate supervisor
c. The employee's shift commander
d. The employee's division commander
e. The PCU representative ~
f. The Deputy Chief/Administrator of the bureau
involved (optional) 31
The intent of the "plan of action" is to correct or reverse
negative behavior through a customized strategy involving
28
structured activity on the part of the officer and close
supervisionby the PersonnelConcernsunit and the officer's
supervisors. At the end of the plan period (usually one
year), the officer is either released to full duty or referred
for additional corrective action (if the officer fails to
achieve the goals of the program). The Personnel Concerns
Program represents an outstanding example of positive
intervention to prevent police misconduct.
COMMUNITY ACCESS
In terms of preventing police misconduct, it is important that
law enforcement practitioners begin to think differently about
many issues. One issue that merits considerable attention is
the degree to which the complaint investigation and
disciplinary
Historically,
process is open to public scrutiny.
these elements of the profession have been
cloaked in secrecy. The almost humorous (if not so tragic)
result of this secrecy in many instances has been police
bewilderment relative to community suspicion of the equity and
vali~ity of the processes. After all, police administrators
"knew" that complaints were thoroughly investigated and
carefully reviewed--whydidn't the community "know" it as
well? It took many years for the law enforcement community to
realize the answer to that dilemma was that their confidence
was based in a thorough knowledge of the complaint and
disciplinary systems in place, whereas the suspicion of the
citizenry was the result of their systematic exclusion from
29
that knowledge. The importance of opening these systems to
public review is considered to be of critical importance by
the American civil Liberties Union:
The common strain underlying all of these areas is the
need for greater openness on issues of local police
misconduct. Too often walls of secrecy hide not only
incidents of brutality but also inadequate responses
to these incidents. The public has a right to be
shown how thoroughly allegations of misconduct are
investigated.32
The manner in which police agencies view citizen
dissatisfaction with their services reveals the true extent of
any pOlige-citizen partnership:
Another important way to demonstrate the integrity of
a complaint mechanism is to encourage citizens to
complain when they feel they have been wronged. How
easy is it for a citizen to complain about a police
officer? If a citizen feels he has been abused by a
police officer, it takes a lot of nerve for him to go
into that officer's station (or any other police
facility) to complain. What can he expect when he
goes in and tells a desk officer that he wants to
initiate an investigation directed at showin~ that oneof the officer's colleagues acted wrongly?3
Logic would seem to support the premise that to the extent a
police agency opens its complaint and disciplinary process to
public view, police misconduct will be reduced or prevented.
If officers are aware that the citizenry is knowledgeable
concerning these procedures, clearly they will be more
circumspect concerning their official behavior. Examples of
how an agency can reach out, through their internal affairs
unit, to the community in an attempt to remove the cloak of
secrecy concerning the complaint investigation and
disciplinary processes include:
30
*Establishment of remote site complaint intake centers
*presentations at community meetings
*sponsoring public workshops and seminars
*Creation of brochures and pamphlets describing the
complaint investigation and disciplinary process
CIVILIAN RBVIEW BOARDS
The issue of civilian oversight of police misconduct
investigations represents one of the most, if not the most,
controversial' subjects
community.
separating the police from the
There is probably no subj ect that so preqictably
raises the hackles of police as civilian investigation
and review of citizens' complaints against officers.'
Conversely f among those who most ardently challenge
the efficacy of police exercise of their author1ty,
probably the most frequently sought after curative is
civili'n review: if the large number of requests to
the Police Foundation for information are any
indicator, civilian review boards are a matter of
increasing concern in American cities.~
Justificatiop fpr civilian oversight of police misconduct
cases is pr~~!qeq by the American civil Liberties Uriion:
Civifia '..' x-ati()1'1will pemi:\tn,~lusiv~,~~"~1



























































There .two factors that ' l're cnJc'1
creditti".,. ..,.f any investi~ats~~~'!yS,~~~;, "\"
qfoperq'fA',ln the system and .;,thepresenqe
of an in, A~ndent civilianre.view mechan~SD;1.
only. as~"11. percentage of poli<;:emisconduct pases ,al.je
S'4staiJ!ed~" ..."It is important to be able to show to the
com~la1nant and the public. that all cases" are fu;l'ly
and fairlY investigated and that the evidence supports
the conclusion that no misconduct occurred. such
information enhances pUblic confidence in both th,e
department and its complaint system. As for the
sustainea cases, secrecy about the investigation and
results prevents other officers in the department from






being "scapegoated" and prevents the pUblic from
evaluating whether or not the discipline is
appropriate for the offense.
There is increasing recognition that since we give
police officers unique powers to make arrests and use
force, civilian oversight of how they exercise those
powers is particularly important. Just as systems of
independent checks and balances serve to curb abuses
of power in other government institutions, civilian
review serves this same function with local police
departments.35
The intensity of resistance by police notwithstanding, it
should be apparent that civilian oversight of police
activities will continue to exist in some form. Of the
various (orms of civilian review in existence, three types are
most common:
The three levels of external review of complaints are
civilian review, civilian input and civilian monitor.
Of these, the strongest in a descriptive sense is pure
civilian review, under which the authority to
investigate, adjudicate and recommend punishment to
the police chief is placed in the external agency.
Civilian input, not such a strong mechanism, places
the authority only for complaints reception and
investigation in the external agency, whilst
adjudication and discipline functions are discharged
internally within the police department. Finally, in
the weakest system, civilian monitor, the
investigation, adjudication and discipline functions
are all discharged internally within the police
department but the procedures are subject to some form
ef external review regarding their adequacy and
impartiality. 36
The notion of civilian oversight of police activities has lost
little, if any, of the intensity of resistance by law
enforcement practitioners over the years. There is little
empirical evidence, however, that civilian oversight has had
any substantial negative impact upon the legitimate concerns
of field officers.
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When discussing the issue of civilian oversight, I
usually tell this story:
One early spring afternoon, a farmer went out to look
at his fields to see how long it would be before he
could begin to plow and plant. As he walked along a
hedgerow, he began to hear the frantic cries of a
young bird which he discovers in the tall grass; it
had fallen or been pushed from a tree. After picking
up the injured bird, he decides to take it home, out
of the cool night air, and nurse it back to health.
But, as he heads back home, he realizes that his wife
would never permit him to bring it into the house. In
the midst of fretting over what to do, the farmer
steps into a pile of cow manure. Then, an idea
strikes him. He bends down and places the bird in the
middle of the warm manure, hoping it will help the
bird survive the cool night air. He heads home. A
half an hour later, a red fox enters the field in
search of a meal and soon finds the bird. In one
swal],ow,it devours the bird. The moral of this story
is: The motives of the person who places us in what
appears to be a stinking situation may be more in our
interest than the one who wants to get us out.
This story is told so as to caution police officers
not to assume that persons who serve as members of
civilian oversight agencies are Machiavellian
antagonists and their decisions will have catastrophic
effects upon police authority and morale. Although
there is meager research into this opinion, what is




There,are three primary means in which the int~rnal affairs
function can assist in the prevention of police misconduct.
Those means are reactive investigations, proactive co~pliance
techniques and as an information source to those individuals,
internal units and external entities that are responsible for
preventing or controlling such behavior. The benefits ot
linking this potential with the re-examination of the mission,
values a~~ prin9iples of policing cannot be overemphasized,
especially at this time in our nation's history. As a result
of recent event~, an opportunity exists to develop something
good from something bad. It is of critical importance to the
future of the country that advantage be taken of that
opportunity. All people share a common interest and a common
goal in creating more responsive and humanistic police
organizations at all levels. The citizenry places heavy
demands on the ~plice, and the citizenry therefore owes it to
them to continuec~topress for a cooperative effort designed to
, ~
~ ~ ~
.",maximize- the resourcesof both in the effort to enhance the
quality of life for all. Communities across America must
-,
demand that local law .enforcement agencies adopt anti-
corruption stra~egies and then support those stra~egies when
implemented..
Although no single organizational structure would
appear to be completely effective in- curtailing
misconduct or corruption, observations by the
Project's staff of numerous police departments
indicate several criteria which must be present if a
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department is to be successful in its anti-corruption
efforts. These criteria include:
--positive lea4ership and a strong commitment by
the chiet administrator to the elimination of
corruption.
--a department relatively free from pervasive
political influence.
--authority and responsibility for anti-corruption
efforts placed appropriately and clearly defined, for
each level within the organization.
--clearly defined policies and procedures.
--an effective internal affairs unit.38
If true progress is to be made, it should be considered
axiomatic that preventing the occurrence of police misconduct
is at the least as important as the manner in which an agency
reacts to it after it occurs. To the extent the personnel of
an agency acknowledge, understand and indeed live the values
and principles of their organization, the incidence of police
misconduct will be reduced or outright prevented. The
internal affairs function is an integral component of the
effort to bring life and substance to the values and
principles of a pOlice organization, and is therefore integral
to the prevention of police misconduct.
35
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